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In 1998, Mr Misha Chaim Baruch Elias was on trial in an English criminal court for 
handling stolen goods. In his closing speech to the jury, the prosecutor said, “Mr 
Elias [is] completely and thoroughly dishonest to the heart, I suggest to you. The 
most self-regarding, utterly cynical, greedy man, you can’t believe a word he says. A 
master of deceit. I draw the analogy with Oliver Twist who is seen in the musical 
where Fagin goes through all the money and the lolly and the jewels because, like 
Fagin, he is in the end keeping his hands on his own material […] he is very similar 
because of course, he doesn’t actually go out and directly grubby his hands with the 
burglary”. In an appeal against his conviction, Mr Elias argued that he had not 
received a fair trial because the jury had been prejudiced by the prosecutor’s “racially 
and religiously offensive” remarks about him. The appeal court, however, dismissed 
his appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that although Mr Elias “might be Jewish”, any 
offence caused “was because of an unfortunate coincidence” as “reference to Fagin 
in the handling of cases occurred almost daily in the courts by way of analogy.” It is 
from this case in which both courts agreed that a literary reference to Fagin with a 
Jewish defendant was merely “an unfortunate coincidence” that Didi Herman’s 
excellent 2011 book, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness & English Law, 
takes its title. The book was the deserving winner of the SLSA-Hart Book Prize 2012. 
Didi Herman is Professor of Law & Social Change at Kent Law School. Her 
book examines reported judicial decisions between 1927 and 2010 in a variety of 
legal cases in which at least one of the litigants identified, or was identified in the 
case, as Jewish in order to map and illustrate the terrain of English judicial 
representations of Jews and Jewishness. In so doing she demonstrates that the 
prevailing narrative of English tolerance, secularism, and multiculturalism is at odds 
with the trajectory of the cases. Instead, the English judiciary draw on and contribute 
to “orientalising and racializing processes to find their way around and through Jews 
and Jewishness” (14) and remain heavily indebted to the portrayal of ‘the Jew’ in 
English literature, most notably the work of Dickens and Shakespeare.   
Herman stresses that she is not interested in identifying antisemitism among 
the English judiciary or in accusing individual judges of antisemitism. Her interest lies 
in exploring “racialized understandings” (24) of Jews in English judicial discourse and 
to this end she rarely uses the word ‘antisemitism’ in her book, a term which, she 
maintains, she does not find helpful. Indeed, she asserts that what she has found in 
the cases is “not ‘hatred’, but distaste, not ‘malice,’ but unease and confusion” (25). 
In this respect Herman takes a critical race approach, which seeks to analyse racial 
discourse rather than catalogue instances of racism. By applying a critical race 
methodology to a consideration of Jews, Jewishness and English law, Herman 
makes an important and original contribution to the field of critical race scholarship. 
There is little critical race scholarship in the field of law in England and Wales, and 
even in the USA where it is plentiful, there is little to no account taken of Jews and 
Jewishness. Accordingly, Herman’s book fills an important gap in the literature, 
providing an account of how, and in relation to what norms, Jews are understood by 
the judiciary, and providing a consideration of racial and religious knowledge 
formation about Jews amongst the judiciary. It is the contention of critical race theory 
that judges are active creators of official racial knowledge.  
  Herman also stresses that she is not concerned with the background, politics, 
religion or ethnicity of any particular judge. Her concern is only with pervasive 
approaches in judicial discourse when dealing with Jews and Jewishness, although 
she does inform the reader that most of the judges come from a Christian, mainly 
Anglican, background. There are one or two Jewish judges mentioned by Herman, 
but she does not identify them as Jewish, nor does she refer to their personal 
background. She merely points out in Chapter 1, An Introduction, that Jewish judges 
who believe themselves to be adjudicating in a secular court system are also 
capable of engaging in race-thinking about Jews and Jewishness. Herman’s refusal 
to consider the personal characteristics of the judges distinguishes her work from 
that of the legal realists who seek to understand judicial decisions by engaging in a 
behavioural analysis of the judge. 
The key argument and theme throughout Herman’s book is that the English 
judiciary engage in “orientalising and racializing processes” (14) in cases involving 
Jews and Jewish issues. She uses the term ‘orientalism’ to signify a range of judicial 
practices that include particular ways of characterising people that have come from 
the ‘east’, along with recurring restatements about what is ‘English.’  In Chapter 2, 
‘An Unfortunate Coincidence’: Race, Nation and Character, Herman demonstrates 
the process of orientalising with a discussion of insurance cases involving allegations 
of fraud against the Jewish claimant on the grounds that he failed to disclose a 
material fact. One such case is Horne v Poland (1922). The Jewish plaintiff’s failure 
to disclose that he had been born in Romania and to state his original Romanian 
Jewish name was held to be a material fact which defeated his insurance claim. In 
finding that his Romanian nationality was a material fact, the judge described the 
plaintiff as “the son of a Romanian Hebrew teacher” and explained that his original 
Eastern European origins were important to judging the risk that the underwriters ran 
in entering the insurance contract with him. The “alien signifiers” (35) that the judge 
ascribed to the plaintiff were juxtaposed against judicial references to high standards 
in English habits, training, education and ‘notoriously exacting’ law. Herman 
suggests that the judicial disparaging of the eastern Jew seen in this case is based 
on an understanding of character through the prism of ‘race’ and ‘nationality’ and 
notes that in the first half of the 20th Century the relationship between Jews, 
Jewishness and English judges was shaped by the waves of Jewish immigration 
from Eastern Europe. She relies on the work of Tony Kushner, who shows that the 
disparaging of the ‘eastern Jew’ persisted unabated in post-war political culture 
generally because he was perceived to have failed to assimilate to English culture 
(see, Tony Kushner, ‘Remembering to Forget: Racism and Anti-racism in Postwar 
Britain,’ in B. Cheyette and L. Marcus (eds), Modernity, Culture and the Jew 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 226 – 41).  Herman maintains that the 
relationship between nation, race and character persists in judicial thinking to the 
present day. 
‘Orientalism’ also has a theological component. Herman uses the term to 
signify a judicial approach that compares the Christian civilization with other 
civilizations and places Christianity at the “civilizational apex of world religions” (15), 
with Judaism in an inferior position. Underpinning this approach is the view that 
Christianity is the true faith that superseded Judaism.  In Chapter 4, ‘She is and Will 
Forever Remain a Jew’: Child Welfare and the Courts, Herman illustrates what she 
refers to as the “Christian imperialism” (15) component of orientalism with a 
discussion of child welfare cases, which include cases involving male circumcision. 
She argues that the courts’ refusal to authorize male circumcision where one parent 
is Christian and the other is Jewish (or Muslim), although draped in the language of 
medical and psychological health, is informed by a Christian imperialism which 
relegates circumcision to an inferior pre-modernity practice of unreason and pain. 
The courts’ decision, however, is as much a normative ethno-religious choice as is 
the act of circumcision itself and it promotes Christian universalism. These decisions, 
suggests Herman, result in judicially authorised de facto Christian conversions. She 
is only able to point to two cases, one decided in 2002 and one decided in 2004, 
where the judges were committed to the possibility of mixed identity for the child, 
which they saw as the court’s duty to facilitate.  
  ‘Racialization’ is the term Herman uses to signify a particular form of 
understanding and way-finding which English judges apply to people they perceive 
to be alien to the ‘home’ environment.  It typically involves the use of phenotypical 
signifiers or characteristics and in the case of Jews often entails an analysis of 
‘blood.’ At the same time, white Christian blood remains unremarked upon. In 
Chapter 3, ‘If Only I Knew’: Race and Faith in the Law of Trusts, Herman uses trusts 
cases to show the racialization process at work in relation to the judges’ 
understanding and characterisation of Jewishness. These trust cases concerned the 
legal enforceability of clauses in the wills of wealthy Jewish testators which provided 
for property transmission to their progeny only if they ‘married in’ the Jewish faith. 
The question of how to determine who was of the ‘Jewish faith’ was therefore crucial 
to deciding the validity of the clauses in question. With a few notable exceptions in 
cases from 1978 onwards, the judges viewed Jewishness in terms of a line of 
historical descent from the ancient Israelites. Herman explains that the judicial 
emphasis on the original Hebraic Jew is an effect of Christian teachings and wider 
abstracting tendencies in English law. She notes that finding this authentic line of 
descent from the Israelites makes Jews meaningful as a racial category but also 
allows them to produce the legal problem of racial ambiguity. This is because the 
judges confessed to not knowing what percentage of ‘Jewish blood’ is enough to 
make someone Jewish; and because no English Jew can be traced through an 
unbroken line to the Hebraic Patriarchs. This left Jewishness indefinable as a racial 
category and therefore the clauses in question had to be declared unenforceable on 
the grounds of uncertainty. Herman notes that the judges could have used Judaism’s 
own historical self-classification based on matrilineal descent to determine 
Jewishness but they made no attempt to enlighten themselves and saw their 
ignorance as determinative. Herman’s point that the judges consistently frustrated 
the intentions of these Jewish testators is well made. She explains that Jewish 
testators inserted conditions into their wills in order to ensure the continuity of Jewish 
families and the Jewish community and that, by refusing to uphold their conditions 
for inheritance, the courts were effectively breaking these familial and communal ties 
and, in many cases, sanctioning the loss of Jewish identity. She uses the word “de-
Judification” (17) to refer to the process of breaking ties to Judaism and Jewish 
communities. She suggests that this is another example of the judicial authorisation 
of de facto Christian conversions that promotes, and is informed by, Christian 
universalism and Christian imperialism. Christianity was found to be wholly knowable 
by the judges in contrast to Judaism. Thus, racialization also has a theological 
component. In fact, Herman makes it clear that Christian normativity underlies both 
the orientalising and the racializing processes. 
Herman explains that by the 1980s ‘race relations’ law and culture had come 
to dominate the field and judges responded by adopting a different racialization 
approach to Jews and Jewishness. The concept of ‘ethnicity’ gradually replaced that 
of ‘race’, although this term was also underpinned by racial assumptions. Herman 
discusses two employment law cases in Chapter 2, ‘An Unfortunate Coincidence’: 
Race, Nation and Character, which illustrate that Jewish parties continued to be held 
in disregard by the judiciary through a series of articulations which, whilst ostensibly 
race-less, succeeded in presenting Jewish parties as un-English and unattractive. In 
both these cases, Seide v Gillette Industries [1980] and Garnel v Brighton Branch of 
the Musicians’ Union [1983], Jewish claimants alleged race discrimination in 
employment and both claims were dismissed. In both instances, the claimant was 
constructed as ‘strange’, ‘intemperate’ and ‘provocative’ and to have deserved what 
he got. Indeed, in Garnel, the claimant’s behaviour was said by the court to have 
engendered a feeling of antisemitism where none had existed previously. In both 
cases, emphasis was placed on the claimant’s conduct, which was ‘over-emotional’, 
‘disruptive’, and ‘impolite’. While the judges focused on conduct and behaviour rather 
than on lineage and ‘blood’, this was also a racializing process. This is because the 
judicial focus on ‘character’ distinguished between English character and the ‘alien’ 
character of the Jew. In Seide, for example, the claimant’s bad behaviour was 
juxtaposed against that of his employer, which was ‘careful and patient’, ‘democratic 
and fair’; while in Garnel, the un-English character of the Jew was brought into 
sharper focus by the allegation that the Jewish claimant failed to accept and 
understand the English rule of law, which was described as ‘fair’, ‘measured’ and 
‘ruly’ and, according to Herman, represented “the perfect English gentleman” (44). 
Herman explains that the racialization process is a two-way one: it also involves a 
depiction of English nationhood and English law as ‘democratic’, ‘fair’, ‘careful’ 
‘patient’ ‘exacting’, ‘orderly,’ and ‘proper.’ Englishness is infused with all that is good 
and valued and Jewishness is everything that Englishness is not. 
 Herman also discusses racialisation from a different perspective in Chapter 5 
‘We Live in The Age of The Holocaust of The Jews’ where she explains that the 
judicial privileging of ‘legal formalism’ is driven and informed by “extrinsic projects of 
racialisation” (107). Legal formalism is the liberal position that says that law can be 
separated from the social world in which it is embedded. It draws a distinction 
between pure law and its social, economic and political contexts.  Herman believes 
that legal formalism is a judicial route that is consciously chosen in cases involving 
Jews and Jewish issues “in order to marginalise extrinsic political factors” (106), that 
is, in order to deem certain facts irrelevant to the court. She illustrates this with a 
discussion of R v Sec of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte Greenberg (1947). This 
case involved an application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to 4,500 
European Jewish passengers on three ships, on the ground that they were being 
unlawfully detained by the British Government off the coast of Palestine. The judge 
denied the writ without any reference to the Holocaust, or indeed, without any 
reference to any of the persecution that led the passengers to leave Europe and flee 
to Palestine. Nor did the judge once mention the fact that the ships’ passengers were 
Jewish, despite their lawyer referring to them throughout as “displaced Jews.”  
According to Herman, this judicial blindness to certain facts served to impose 
Christian norms and values, synonymous with secular norms and values, on the law 
and evinced total indifference to the millions of Jewish deaths. In this respect, the 
claim of the Jewish litigants was not only denied but their lived experience was 
marginalised and disrespected. Indeed, it is the contention of critical race theorists 
that the courts’ adherence to legal formalism in cases involving race results in the 
law’s failure to address the minority experience and to understand the nature of 
racism. This is because race or ethnicity is an account of social being; it is the lived 
experience, and recognition of minority suffering therefore requires judicial sensitivity 
to social and political context. 
Herman has produced an insightful, lively, thought-provoking and important 
book on a subject that has hitherto been ignored. Moreover, it is well-structured, 
clearly written, and has an engaging style that is accessible to lay people as well as 
to lawyers. It is hoped that she will build on this work by adding a chapter on Fraser v 
The University & College Union (2013). This is a discrimination case under the 
Equality Act 2010 whose lengthy judgment dismissing a Jewish trade union 
member’s claim against his academic union for antisemitic harassment is replete 
with race-thinking of the kind that Herman identifies in the Seide and Garnel cases. It 
is also hoped that she, or others, will widen the scope of her investigation to include 
the decisions of regulatory bodies and universities. There is evidence of race-
thinking about Jews among regulators, such as local authorities when passing anti-
Israel boycott motions, and in universities when dealing with student complaints 
about anti-Zionist expression on campus. Much academic work needs to be done to 
verify and expose this unsatisfactory phenomenon, which is facilitating the gradual 
development of a climate distinctly hostile to Britain’s Jewish population. In the 
meantime, Didi Herman’s book, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness & 
English Law, thoroughly deserves to be read. 
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